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Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc.: Addressing the 
Preemptive Scope of the Tobacco Control Act for 
Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems 
DANIEL S. HAUSMAN*©  
ABSTRACT 
The promise offered by e-cigarette manufactures like JUUL Labs, Inc. of a healthier 
alternative to conventional combustible tobacco products has been eradicated as 
reports of skyrocketing teenage nicotine addiction and serious health concerns from 
the use of e-cigarettes continue to emerge. Ever since the Surgeon General declared 
tobacco a health risk in 1964, Congress and the judiciary have dealt with tobacco 
manufacturers who falsely advertised their product as safer to assuage the concerns 
of consumers. The Tobacco Control Act, passed in 2009, is Congress’ latest attempt 
to regulate the tobacco industry to ensure consumers are adequately informed 
about the health risks of tobacco products, including what tobacco manufactures 
can say about “modified risk tobacco products” such as e-cigarettes. One of the first 
major challenges to the preemptive scope of the Tobacco Control Act regarding 
modified risk tobacco products came in April 2018 when a class action suit filed in 
the District Court of California alleged JUUL Labs misrepresented the amount of nic-
otine inhaled by users of its incredibly popular e-cigarette, the JUUL. Although JUUL 
Labs successfully argued that the Tobacco Control Act preempts them from having 
to adjust the nicotine warnings labels on its product, the District Court held that the 
claim that JUUL Labs misrepresented how much nicotine was present in its product 
in its advertising was not preempted. This comment aims to address the correctness 
of the District Court’s preemption ruling, and the ramifications it will have on the e-
cigarette industry. This comment will accomplish this by examining the growth of e-
cigarette use in the United States, the legislative and judicial history of tobacco prod-
uct regulation, and the language of the Tobacco Control Act’s preemptive clause. 
This comment will then address the District Court’s motion to dismiss ruling in Col-
gate v. JUUL Labs, Inc., and why the Court’s interpretation of the Tobacco Control 
Act’s preemptive scope was correct. The Comment will then discuss how this ruling 
will likely not impact the explosive growth of the e-cigarette industry, and why fur-
ther regulation may be necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
JUUL Labs, Inc., the maker of the popular electronic cigarette “JUUL,” has recently 
found itself at the center of controversy as more teenagers become addicted to 
their product.1 In April 2018, a class action lawsuit alleging that JUUL Labs misrep-
resented the true addictive nature of its e-cigarette was filed in the District Court of 
California.2 In October 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that the label-
ing on the JUUL did not adequately warn consumers that its nicotine salt formula-
tion was more addictive than conventional nicotine because the Tobacco Control 
Act (“TCA”) preempts any additional labeling requirements on tobacco products.3 
However, the court held that the TCA did not preempt the claim and that JUUL Labs 
mispresented the amount of nicotine in its advertisements for the JUUL.4  This hold-
ing was reaffirmed after the plaintiffs consolidated several similar class action law-
suits and filed a consolidated class action complaint.5 The potential ramifications of 
the District Court’s decision regarding the preemptive scope of the Tobacco Control 
Act is the focus of this comment.   
The federal government’s involvement in tobacco regulation has had a substan-
tial effect on the way tobacco companies advertise their products.6 Ever since the 
Surgeon General’s Smoking and Health report of 1964 and the subsequent passage 
of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”),7 tobacco compa-
nies have had to modify how they advertise their products.8 Tobacco companies 
were able to withstand numerous private litigant lawsuits, however, by arguing that 
the FCLAA forbade individual plaintiffs from bringing state tort claims of misrepre-
sentation.9 Several decades later, the Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc.10 and Altria Group, Inc. v. Good11 clarified that plaintiffs may bring a wide range 
of state tort claims when trying to combat the deceptive advertising practices of the 
tobacco industry.12 
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 1. See Jamie Ducharme, Teens Are ‘Juuling’ At School. Here’s What That Means, TIME (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://time.com/5211536/what-is-juuling/. 
 2. See Nitasha Tiku, Users Sue Juul for Addicting Them to Nicotine, WIRED (July 23, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/users-sue-juul-for-addicting-them-to-nicotine/. 
 3. Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1189–90 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144027 at 29–30. 
 6. See infra Part II. A. 
 7. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.A §1334 (1965). 
 8. See infra Part II. A. 
 9. See infra text accompanying note 101. 
 10. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 11. 129 U.S. 70 (2008). 
 12. See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 U.S. 70, 82-3 (2008). 
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After the passage of the TCA in 2008, it appeared many state tort claims involving 
the false advertising of cigarettes would be able to survive a preemptory chal-
lenge.13 However, the TCA still contained the FCLAA provisions restricting state 
modification of tobacco product warning labels.14 After the FDA ruled in 2016 that 
electronic nicotine delivery systems (“ENDS”) such as the JUUL would be regulated 
as tobacco products under the TCA,15 questions arose as to what extent the con-
gressional preemptive scope afforded to conventional tobacco products would ap-
ply to ENDS.16   
This comment suggests that the District Court’s decision regarding the preemp-
tive scope of the TCA was correct. As a result, electronic cigarette manufacturers, 
including JUUL Labs, will not be required to place labels on their products indicating 
nicotine salts may be more addictive or dangerous than traditional nicotine.17 Alt-
hough existing laws can protect consumers from false advertisements, more strin-
gent regulations will be needed to ensure consumers are protected from the effects 
of modified risk tobacco products like e-cigarettes.   
This comment proceeds in three parts. Part I will examine what is an e-cigarette, 
how JUUL came to dominate the e-cigarette market, and controversies concerning 
the health risks of the product, especially amongst teenage users. Part II will explain 
the history of ‘healthier’ cigarette litigation, and the preemptive scope of the FCLAA 
and TCA. Part III will address the JUUL lawsuit, the District Court’s ruling on JUUL’s 
Motion to Dismiss, and the implications this may have for electronic cigarette man-
ufacturers like JUUL Labs, Inc. 
I. THE RISE OF E-CIGARETTES 
A. What Are Electronic Cigarettes? 
Electronic cigarettes, commonly known as e-cigarettes, “aim to provide a similar 
sensation to inhaling tobacco smoke, without the smoke.”18 These devices are 
sometimes referred to as “e-cigs, e-hookahs, mods, vape pens, vapes, tank systems 
and electronic nicotine delivery systems.”19 Some e-cigarettes are made to appear 
like regular cigarettes or cigars, while others closely resemble pens and USB sticks.20 
 
 13. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra note 120 and accompanying text 
 16. See infra note 136. 
 17. See infra Part III. C. 
 18. Yvette Brazier, Are E-Cigarettes a Safe Alternative to Smoking?, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (Jun. 25, 2018), 
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/216550.php. 
 19. CDC, ABOUT ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-ciga-
rettes/about-e-cigarettes.html. 
 20. Id. 
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Several companies that develop e-cigarettes market their product as a means to 
help users quit traditional tobacco products or quit smoking altogether.21 
The first device resembling the modern e-cigarette was created in 1960 by Her-
bert A. Gilber,22 and the first commercially successful e-cigarette was created in 
2003 by Hon Lik, a Chinese pharmacist.23 Mr. Lik created the e-cigarette in the hopes 
that it would be a safer alternative to inhaling nicotine through conventional means 
after his father passed away from lung cancer.24 The company for which Mr. Lik 
developed the e-cigarette, Golden Dragon Holdings, changed its name to Ruyan, 
which means “like smoke,” and began selling the device all over the world.25 E-cig-
arettes were first introduced to America in approximately 200626 and grew to 5.5 
billion dollars in sales in just 12 years.27 
Most e-cigarettes contain a battery and heating element to vaporize a liquid 
which usually contains nicotine, the addictive chemical found in cigarettes and ci-
gars.28  When the user sucks on the mouthpiece of the device, a sensor activates 
the heating element, vaporizing the liquid solution and creating an aerosol solution 
that the user inhales.29 The solution, known as e-liquid or e-juice, comes in flavors 
ranging from traditional tobacco flavors to fruity flavors like watermelon.30 Most e-
cigarettes are reusable and have refillable cartridges.31 
 
 21. See JUUL, https://www.JUUL.com/mission-values (last visited Feb. 1, 2018) (“We envision a world 
where fewer people use cigarettes, and where people who smoke cigarettes have the tools to reduce or elimi-
nate their consumption entirely, should they so desire”); see also JOYETECH, 
https://www.joyetech.com/news/electronic-cigarette-helps-people-stop-smoking/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) 
(“At a time when the government is ostensibly trying to cut health costs, why is it trying to ban something that 
might help people quit smoking tobacco, perhaps the most devastating health problem in the U.S.?”). 
 22. A Historical Timeline of Electronic Cigarettes, CONSUMER ADVOCATES FOR SMOKE FREE ALTERNATIVES ASS’N, 
http://www.casaa.org/historical-timeline-of-electronic-cigarettes/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2018). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Nicole M. Kuiper et al., Trends in Unit Sales of Flavored and Menthol Electronic Cigarettes in the United 
States, 2012–2016, 15 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE: PUB. HEALTH RES., PRACTICE AND POL.(2018). 
 28. CDC, ABOUT ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-ciga-
rettes/about-e-cigarettes.html. 
 29. Yvette Brazier, Are e-cigarettes a safe alternative to smoking?, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (Jun. 25, 2018), 
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/216550.php. 
 30. Id. Several states, including Michigan and New York, have enacted outright bans on flavored e-ciga-
rettes. See Sheila Kaplan, Trump Administration Plans to Ban Flavored E-Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/health/trump-vaping.html. Furthermore, the Trump administration is 
considering a nationwide ban on flavored e-cigarettes. Id. 
 31. See Brazier, supra note 29. 
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B. JUUL Takes Over the E-Cigarette Market 
One year after Hon Lik developed the modern e-cigarette, Stanford product-design 
graduate students Adam Bowen and James Monsees began developing their own 
e-cigarette.32 Bowen and Monsees smoked traditional tobacco products for many 
years, and sought to create a viable alternative to cigarettes.33 In 2012, their first 
company, Ploom, developed the Pax, an e-cigarette roughly the shape and size of 
an iPhone and selling for approximately $250.34 After selling the Ploom brand in 
2015, Bowen and Monsees rebranded the company as Pax Labs35 and began work-
ing on what would be their most successful device, the JUUL.36 
Unlike most vaping devices which were “unattractively large or required users to 
monitor finicky temperature settings, coils, and wicks,”37 Bowen and Monsees’s cre-
ation, the JUUL, is simple and small38—roughly the shape and size of a USB flash 
drive.39 The device avoids the glowing tip of a cigarette because “they wanted peo-
ple who used the JUUL to feel as if they were doing something new.”40 
The company used focus groups with longtime smokers to develop a “flavor 
strategy” which includes “a tobacco profile, a mint profile, a fruit profile, [and] a 
dessert profile.”41 A JUUL “starter” kit, which includes a rechargeable JUUL device, 
a USB charger, four pods with the company’s four main flavor profiles,42 and a one 
year warranty sells for approximately $20.43 A pack of four flavor pods costs approx-
imately $16,44 with each pod lasting for approximately 200 puffs, or the equivalent 
of one pack of cigarettes.45 Using a JUUL can be cheaper than smoking conventional 
 
 32. See Jia Tolentino, The promise of Vaping and the Rise of JUUL, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/14/the-promise-of-vaping-and-the-rise-of-juul. 
 33. OUR STORY, https://www.JUUL.com/our-story (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 34. David H. Freedman, How you Sell a Product When You Can’t Really Say What it Does?, INC., 
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201405/david-freedman/james-monsees-ploom-ecigarette-company-mar-
keting-dilemma.html. 
 35. See JTI Buys Ploom Name and Product; Ploom becomes Pax Labs, TOBACCO REPORTER (Feb. 16, 2015), 
https://www.tobaccoreporter.com/2015/02/jti-buys-ploom-name-and-product-ploom-becomes-pax-labs/. 
 36. See Tolentino, supra note 32. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. CDC, E-CIGARETTES SHAPED LIKE USB FLASH DRIVES: INFORMATION FOR PARENTS, EDUCATORS, AND HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/infographics/youth/pdfs/e-cigarettes-usb-flash-508.pdf. 
 40. See Tolentino, supra note 32. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. STARTER KIT, https://www.JUUL.com/shop/devices/starter-kit (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
 44. Hayley Peterson, ‘I Go Crazy If I Don’t Have It’: American Teens Are Going Wild Over an Addictive E-
Cigarette Developed by Stanford Graduates, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2018, 11:14 AM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/juul-e-cigarettes-are-taking-over-high-schools-2018-3. 
 45. Id.; However, the amount of nicotine in each pod is disputed. See JUUL, https://www.juul.com/calcu-
lator (last visited Oct 4. 2019) (explaining that the a JUUL pod’s nicotine content gives an equivalent yield to a 
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cigarettes as it is not subject to the high cigarette taxes found in places like New 
York, New England, and Chicago.46 
An innovation that had a substantial impact on the success of Bowen and Mon-
sees’ device was the use of nicotine salts as the core ingredient in their liquid-nico-
tine juice.47 Prior to the launch of the JUUL, e-cigarette brands were not creating 
many return customers because the sensation of smoking an e-cigarette did not 
compare to the sensation of smoking a traditional cigarette.48 The JUUL solved this 
problem by using a liquid that contains nicotine salts.49 The body absorbs nicotine 
salts at almost the same speed as nicotine in regular cigarettes, “delivering a hit of 
nicotine similar to that of a traditional cigarette.”50 Unlike cigarette smoke, how-
ever, which causes irritation to the chest and lungs when inhaled, the vapor created 
by nicotine salts goes down smoothly.51 
These innovations have contributed to the JUUL’s tremendous commercial suc-
cess. JUUL represents over 50 percent of sales in the e-cigarette traditional retail 
market despite only being launched in 2015.52 JUUL Labs, which was spun off from 
the parent company Pax Labs in 2017, was recently valued at $15 billion.53 JUUL 
Labs’ year-over-year sales, ending June 16, 2018, grew 783 percent, reaching ap-
proximately $942.6 million.54 In the same period, e-cigarette sales as a whole grew 
97 percent to $1.96 billion.55 In 2018, JUUL Labs raised $1.2 billion in a financing 
round to help fund an international expansion.56 However, international expansion 
 
pack of cigarettes). But see Tiku, supra note 2 (citing James F. Pankow et. al., Benzene Formation in Electronic 
Cigarettes, PLOS, (Mar. 8, 2017) (arguing that “JUUL may deliver higher levels of nicotine than advertised.”). 
 46. See Tolentino, supra note 32. 
 47. Ryan Lawler, Vaporization Startup Pax Labs Introduces JUUL, Its Next-Gen E-Cigarette, TECH CRUNCH 
(Apr. 21, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/04/21/pax-JUUL/. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Julia Belluz, JUUL, The Vape Device Teens Are Getting Hooked On, Explained, VOX (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:44 
PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/5/1/17286638/JUUL-vaping-e-cigarette. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See What’s the Hype? JUUL Electronic Cigarette’s Popularity with Youth & Young Adults, PUBLIC HEALTH 
LAW CENTER, http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/JUUL-Webinar-Slides-Apr262018.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2019)). 
 53. Angelica LaVito, Popular E-Cigarette JUUL’s Sales Have Surged Almost 800 Percent Over the Past Year, 
CNBC (Sep. 11, 2018, 2:24 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/02/juul-e-cigarette-sales-have-surged-over-
the-past-year.html. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Olivia Zaleski, E-Cigarette Maker JUUL Labs is Raising $1.2 Billion, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2018, 5:22 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-29/e-cigarette-maker-JUUL-labs-is-raising-1-2-billion. 
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may be difficult in some parts of the world as the JUUL is banned in the European 
Union and Israel due to health concerns.57 
C. The Tremendous Growth of E-Cigarettes leads to Increased Scrutiny   
The success of e-cigarettes like JUUL has led to increased public scrutiny of the prod-
ucts’ safety.58 At the direction of Congress, the FDA commissioned the National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (“NAS”)59 to conduct a study to 
help inform future regulations on the product.60 The NAS analyzed the findings of 
800 peer-reviewed studies on the health effects of e-cigarettes, leading to mixed 
conclusions regarding the safety of the product.61 
One positive finding revealed in the NAS study was that “completely substituting 
e-cigarettes for combustible tobacco cigarettes reduces users’ exposure to numer-
ous toxicants and carcinogens present in combustible tobacco cigarettes.”62 This 
finding prompted former FDA commissioner Scott Gottlieb to state that there is a 
place for e-cigarettes in the US market even though some of the findings in the 
study are worrisome.63 
The NAS study did not find enough evidence to conclude that e-cigarettes help 
users of conventional tobacco products quit smoking.64 This finding was based on 
the strength of the evidence available to them.65 With only three experimental stud-
ies using randomized controlled trials to work with, the NAS concluded that there 
was “insufficient evidence that e-cigarettes can help people quit smoking.”66 In ob-
servational studies, which carry less weight than the experimental studies, the NAS 
did find “moderate evidence . . . that more frequent use of e-cigarettes is associated 
with increased likelihood of cessation.”67 Taken together, however, the NAS 
 
 57. Dan Williams, Israel Bans JUUL E-Cigarettes Citing ‘Grave’ Public Health Risk, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2018, 
2:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecigarettes-israel/israel-bans-JUUL-e-cigarettes-citing-grave-
public-health-risk-idUSKCN1L61YW. 
 58. See Kathleen Stratton, et al., Public Health Consequences of E-Cigarettes, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF 
SCIENCES ENGINEERING MEDICINE CONSENSUS STUDY REPORT, JAN. 23, 2018 [“Hereinafter referred to as “NAS Study”]. 
 59. Press Release, FDA, FDA In Brief: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine releases 
FDA-commissioned report on the potential public health consequences of e-cigarettes (Jan. 23, 2018) (on file 
with author). 
 60. See Stratton, supra note 58. 
 61. Julia Belluz, 4 Big Takeaways from the Most Comprehensive Report on E-Cigarettes Yet, VOX (Jan. 22, 
2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/1/23/16923070/nas-report-e-cigarettes-
health-risks. 
 62. See Belluz, supra note 61. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Belluz, supra note 61. 
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concluded there is insufficient evidence to support the assertion that e-cigarettes 
help users quit smoking.68 
Though the NAS study made no findings on the long-term health impacts of e-
cigarette use,69 e-cigarettes have been the alleged cause of hypersensitivity pneu-
monitis, or “wet lung,” a condition that can lead to respiratory failure.70 E-cigarettes 
that use diacetyl in their e-liquid have been the alleged cause of bronchiolitis oblit-
erans, or popcorn lung,71 a condition that can cause lasting respiratory damage.72 A 
2015 study by The England Journal of Medicine indicated that formaldehyde, a car-
cinogen, was detected in e-juice when heated at high voltage.73 
The immense popularity of JUULs among students in middle and high schools has 
led to growing concerns amongst public health officials.74 In 2018, the National In-
stitute on Drug Abuse released its findings that 37 percent of 12th graders reported 
using a vaping device at least once in the past 12 months.75 Most teens, however, 
were not aware that JUUL pods contained nicotine,76 a chemical that “is highly ad-
dictive and may harm the developing teenage brain by increasing the risk of 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. Since the NAS Study was published, vaping related illnesses have prompted the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to issue warnings on using these products. 
See Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with E-cigarette Use, or Vaping, CDC (Oct. 3, 2019, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html#latest-outbreak-in-
formation (as of October 1, 2019, there have been 1,080 cases of lung injury and 15 confirmed deaths from the 
use of e-cigarette or other vaping products in the United States); see also Lung Illnesses Associated with Use of 
Vaping Products, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/lung-illnesses-associated-use-
vaping-products (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“[b]oth the US. Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention are working tirelessly to investigate the distressing incidents of severe res-
piratory illness associated with use of vaping products.”). 
 70. See Casey G. Sommerfeld, et al., Hypersensitivity Pneumonitis and Actus Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
from E-Cigarette Use, PEDIATRICS, Jun. 28, 2017). 
 71. See Tolentino, supra note 32. 
 72. What Is Popcorn Lung?, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/lung/popcorn-lung#2 (last visited Oct 18. 
2018). 
 73. See R. Paul Jensen, et al. Hidden Formaldehyde in E-Cigarette Aerosols, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF 
MEDICINE, (2015). But see Toni Clarke, Ramping Up E-Cigarette Voltage Produces More Dangerous Formalde-
hyde, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ramping-up-e-cigarette-voltage-pro-
duces-more-dangerous-formaldehyde/ (explaining that critics of this study are not convinced of the risk be-
cause “most “vapers” do not push the voltage to the levels seen in the study as the taste would become 
unpalatable.”). 
 74. See Peterson, supra note 44. 
 75. Moriah Balingit, In the ‘Juul room’: E-cigarettes spawn a form of teen addiction that worries doctors, 
parents and schools, WASH POST (July 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/helpless-to-
the-draw-of-nicotine-doctors-parents-and-schools-grapple-with-teens-addicted-to-e-ciga-
rettes/2019/07/25/e1e8ac9c-830a-11e9-933d-7501070ee669_story.html. 
 76. See Anna Edney, Teens say they don’t vape, they ‘Juul.’ That makes the activity hard to track, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-juul-vape-ecigarette-suorin-20190429-
story.html (the Truth Initiative, an anti-tobacco group, found that 63% of Juul users ages 15 to 24 were unaware 
the product contained nicotine). 
 DANIEL S. HAUSMAN 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 223 
attention problems and depression.”77 Furthermore, teens who use e-cigarettes are 
more likely to try conventional cigarettes.78 This comes at a time when youth smok-
ing rates have been falling in recent years.79 
Former FDA commissioner Scott Gottlieb sounded a more worrisome tone in a 
September 2018 public statement compared to his reaction to the NAS study. In the 
statement, he referred to the rise in adolescent use of and addiction to e-cigarettes 
as an “epidemic.”80 He further elaborated that, “[e]-cigs have become an almost 
ubiquitous — and dangerous trend among teens. The disturbing and accelerating 
trajectory of use we’re seeing in youth, and the resulting path to addiction, must 
end.”81 
To combat the dramatic rise in the use of e-cigarettes by teens, the FDA sent 
notices to five e-cigarette manufacturers whose products represent more than 
ninety-seven percent of the market for e-cigs, including JUUL Labs.82 The notice re-
quired these companies to come up with a plan to combat the widespread use of 
their products by minors in sixty days or face increased regulatory enforcement.83 
As a response, JUUL Labs announced it would suspend all social media promotions 
and the sale of most of its flavored pods in retail stores.84 However, Commissioner 
Gottlieb responded in a Tweet, stating “[v]oluntary action is no substitute for regu-
latory steps . . . But we want to recognize actions by JUUL today and urge all manu-
facturers to immediately implement steps to start reversing these trends.”85 
 
 77. Zen Vuong, Teens Who Vape Higher Doses of Nicotine Are More Likely to Become Regular Smokers, USC 
NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017), https://news.usc.edu/130102/teens-who-vape-higher-doses-of-nicotine-are-more-likely-
to-become-regular-smokers/. 
 78. See Teens and E-Cigarettes, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-top-
ics/trends-statistics/infographics/teens-e-cigarettes (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“30.7 percent of e-cig users 
started smoking within 6 months while 8.1 percent of non-users started smoking. Smoking includes combustible 
tobacco products (cigarettes, cigars, and hookahs”); see also Belluz, supra note 61 (“[t]he evidence base was 
large enough and consistent enough and strong enough to conclude that there’s an association between e-
cigarette use and ever-use of combustible tobacco”). 
 79. See Belluz, supra note 61. 
 80. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STATEMENT FROM FDA COMMISSIONER SCOTT GOTTLIEB, M.D., ON NEW STEPS TO 
ADDRESS EPIDEMIC OF YOUTH E-CIGARETTE USE (2018). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, JUUL Suspends Selling Most E-Cigarette Flavors in Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/health/juul-ecigarettes-vaping-teenagers.html. Recently, 
JUUL Labs suspended all product advertisements and will refrain from lobbying against a proposed ban on its 
flavored products. Laurie McGinley, Juul says its chief executive is stepping down, accepts proposed ban on 
flavored vaping products, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/juul-an-
nounces-it-is-replacing-chief-executive-accepting-proposed-ban-on-most-flavored-vaping-prod-
ucts/2019/09/25/563ee81e-df8a-11e9-b199-f638bf2c340f_story.html. 
 85. Scott Gottlieb (@SGottliebFDA), TWITTER. (Nov. 13, 2018, 2:52 PM), https://twitter.com/SGottlieb-
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Amidst the growing concern from parents, health officials, and the FDA on the 
rise in teenage usage of e-cigarettes, JUUL Labs now faces a class action lawsuit 
alleging it deceived users into thinking the product was a safer alternative to con-
ventional cigarettes. 86 To give historical context to the arguments in the class action 
lawsuit Colgate v. JUUL Labs, the next section in this comment will examine the 
history of tobacco product litigation and regulation. 
II. A HISTORY OF TOBACCO PRODUCT LITIGATION AND REGULATION 
A. The Regulation of “Reduced Risk” Cigarettes 
In the early 1950’s, a growing body of scientific literature asserted that the usage of 
tobacco products increased the possibility of fatal health risks such as lung cancer.87 
The tobacco industry responded by developing filtered cigarettes and advertising 
these products as a healthier alternative.88 However, the tobacco industry eventu-
ally moved away from explicit health claims regarding filtered cigarettes in favor of 
subtler tactics to imply their product was healthier.89 Advertising tactics such as la-
beling their cigarettes as “light” or “low tar” would result in decades of litigation as 
addicted consumers sought to hold the industry accountable for their deceptive 
marketing.90 
The 1964 Surgeon General report ushered in several new laws that had a signif-
icant impact on the success of consumer litigation against tobacco manufacturers. 
Many consumers of tobacco products first became aware of the dangerous health 
consequences of using these products after the 1964 Surgeon General report found 
evidence of a substantial link between fatal health risks such as lung cancer and 
cigarette usage.91 As a result of the report, Congress passed the FCLAA  which re-
quired cigarette packages to contain warnings about the adverse health effects of 
 
 86. See Tiku, supra note 2. 
 87. See Tara Parker-Pope, “Safer” Cigarettes: A History, PBS (Oct. 2, 2001), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/safer-cigarettes-history/. 
 88. See Richard W. Pollay & Timothy Dewhirst, The Dark Side of Marketing Seemingly “Light” Cigarettes: 
Successful Images and Failed Fact, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 18, 18 (2002) (explaining that tobacco companies adver-
tised filters as scientific breakthroughs, and even implied in their advertisements that these filters were en-
dorsed by the American Medical Association). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See generally id. (discussing the tobacco industries’ use of dubious health claims to convince wary con-
sumers their product is safe); see “Light” Cigarettes and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST, https://www.can-
cer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/tobacco/light-cigarettes-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) 
(although many smokers chose light cigarettes because they believed it would be less harmful to their health, 
light cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes). 
 91. See Pollay, supra note 88. See Smoking & Tobacco Use A Brief History, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/to-
bacco/data_statistics/sgr/history/index.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (the 1964 Surgeon General report con-
cluded that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer and chronic bronchitis). 
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smoking.92 To overcome the issue of inconsistent state labeling requirements, the 
FCLAA prohibited the requirements of additional statements relating to smoking 
and health on cigarette packages.93 
In the absence of federal action, several states such as California prepared regu-
lations that would restrict or outright ban print and electronic cigarette advertise-
ments.94 In keeping with the declared purpose of the FCLAA to promote uniform 
labeling and advertising measures,95 Congress enacted the Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1969 (“the 1969 Act”).96 The 1969 Act required tobacco companies 
to change the warnings on cigarette packages from cigarettes “may be hazardous” 
to smoking is “dangerous.”97 Furthermore, the 1969 Act’s modified preemption pro-
vision replaced the FCLAA’s with the following language: “[n]o requirement or pro-
hibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect 
to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes that packages of which are label-
ing in conformity with the provisions of this Act.”98 
In the years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone v. Ligget Group, 
Inc. the preemption provision in the 1969 Act was interpreted by courts to give to-
bacco companies insurmountable defenses for product liability claims.99 Tobacco 
companies successfully argued that Congress intended to preempt different forms 
of state regulation with the new language of the 1969 Act. 100 If that argument 
failed, tobacco companies were successful in arguing that tobacco users were ade-
quately warned of the risk of smoking by Congress.101 
B. Defining the Scope of the FCLAA 
1. Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc. 
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of preemption under the FCLAA in Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group. The plaintiff, the spouse of a lifelong smoker who died of lung 
cancer, claimed tobacco manufacturer Liggett Group should be held liable for his 
wife’s death because the company failed to adequately warn consumers about the 
 
 92. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331. 
 93. Altria v. Good, 129 U.S. 70, 78 (2008). 
 94. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515 n.11 (1992). 
 95. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331(2). 
 96. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515 (1992). 
 97. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515 (1992). 
 98. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b). 
 99. See Sam F. Halabi, The Scope of Preemption under the 2009 Family Smoking and Tobacco Control Act, 
71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 300, 305 (2016) (“When Congress changed the warning from cigarettes “may be hazardous” 
to smoking “is dangerous” they also broadened the scope of the federal warning requirement’s preemptive 
effect on state law.”). 
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hazards of smoking its product.102 The Court held that while both the 1965 and 1969 
Acts preempted states from regulating advertisements relating to smoking and 
health,103 a manufacturer’s duty to not deceive consumers was not intended to be 
preempted by the Acts.104 The result of this decision was that plaintiffs could now 
successfully claim the tobacco manufacturers deceived them into thinking its prod-
uct was safe, survive summary judgment, and let a jury decide the merit of their 
claims.105 
2. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good 
Altria Group Inc. v. Good further defined the relationship between the FCLAA and 
tobacco litigation involving state law tort claims. The question faced by the Su-
preme Court was whether the FCLAA preempted a claim of false advertisement un-
der the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (“MUTPA”).106 The plaintiffs, longtime 
smokers of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights cigarettes, alleged that the to-
bacco manufacturer Altria Group violated MUTPA because it advertised the un-
founded claim that its “light” cigarette delivered less harmful chemicals like tar and 
nicotine than regular brands.107 The District Court granted summary judgement to 
Altria Group, holding that a state tort failure-to-warn claim is preempted by the 
FCLAA per the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cipollone.108 The Court of Appeals re-
versed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals.109 
Justice Stevens, who authored the prior decision of Cipollone, explained that the 
labeling requirement and preemption provisions of the FCLAA “express Congress’ 
determination that the prescribed federal warnings are both necessary and suffi-
cient to achieve its purpose of informing the public of the health consequences of 
smoking.”110 Consequently, “[s]tates may not impede commerce in cigarettes by 
enforcing rules that are based on assumption that the federal warnings are inade-
quate.”111 However, Justice Stevens found that Congress did not intend to preempt 
 
 102. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992). 
 103. See id. at 528–29. Justice Stevens explained that “congress’ enactment of a provision defining the 
preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.” Id. at 517. 
 104. Id. at 528–29. 
 105. See Christopher J. Gagin, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: A Preemptive Lucky Strike?, 26 AKRON L. REV. 
311, 321 (1992) (explaining that plaintiffs claiming tobacco related health injuries still faced obstacles at trial, 
such as convincing a jury they did not assume the risk, and competing with the vast legal resources at tobacco 
companies’ disposal). 
 106. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 U.S. 70, 72–73 (2008). 
 107. Id. at 73. 
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state tort claims that plaintiffs were induced to purchase the tobacco products by 
fraudulent claims that they were “light” or had less nicotine.112 
3. The Passage of the Tobacco Control Act 
Before 2009, restrictions on the sale and use of tobacco products were almost en-
tirely done through state and local regulations.113 Tobacco was not regulated under 
federal health and safety laws, including the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, except 
in the rare circumstances when manufacturers of tobacco products made explicit 
health claims.114 In order to give the federal government increased authority to re-
strict the sale and distribution of unsafe tobacco products, Congress passed the 
TCA, which adds a new section (Chapter IX) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.115 
The TCA gives the FDA authority to regulate new and existing tobacco products, 
including the ability to “restrict tobacco product marketing and advertising, 
strengthen cigarette and smokeless tobacco warning labels, reduce federal 
preemption of certain state cigarette advertising restrictions, and increase nation-
wide efforts to block tobacco product sales to youth.”116 
The TCA also enables the FDA to prohibit health claims on tobacco products un-
less supported by scientific evidence.117 Section 387k(g) defines any product that 
makes an explicit health claim as a modified risk tobacco product.118 The TCA regu-
lates these products, rather than outright banning them, in the hope that harm re-
duction products could achieve the individual and public health objectives of the 
law.119 On May 5, 2016, the FDA released a new rule that extends the FDA’s author-
ity to ENDS, which includes the JUUL.120 
 
 112. Altria Group, Inc., 129 U.S. at 82–83. 
 113. See Jonathan Gruber, The Economics of Tobacco Regulation, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 146, 159 (2002) (explain-
ing how states used excise taxes on cigarettes, restrictions on smoking in public places, and age-related re-
strictions to curb the use of tobacco products). 
 114. See Federal Regulation of Tobacco: A Summary, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, July 2009. 
 115. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act – An Overview, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/to-
bacco-products/rules-regulations-and-guidance/family-smoking-prevention-and-tobacco-control-act-over-
view (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). 
 116. Federal Regulation of Tobacco, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/top-
ics/commercial-tobacco-control/federal-regulation-tobacco (last visited Oct. 12, 2019); see Tobacco Control 
Act, 21 USCA §387k. 
 117. See Tobacco Control Act, 21 USCA §387k(b)(2)(A). 
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 119. See Halabi, supra note 99 at 308. 
 120. See Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28973 (May 10, 2016). 
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C. Preemptive scope of the Tobacco Control Act 
Article VI of the Constitution states that the laws of the United States “shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land.”121 When dealing with issues pertaining to the Supremacy 
Clause, state law is not intended to be superseded by a federal act unless there is a 
clean and manifest purpose of Congress.122 The intent of Congress can be found 
explicitly stated in the language of the statute or implied based on structure and 
purpose of the act.123 Without express language to the contrary, state law is 
preempted if the law conflicts with federal law.124 
The Supreme Court has identified several ways in which a statute implicitly 
preempts state law. Impossibility preemption occurs when state and federal law are 
in direct conflict, making it impossible to comply with both laws.125 Obstacle 
preemption results when compliance with both federal and state law is possible, 
but still imposes an obstacle to compliance with the federal law.126 Field preemp-
tion occurs when the courts determine congress intended to so thoroughly occupy 
a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it.127 
In a preemption analysis, courts will consider the preemption clause in a stat-
ute.128 These preemption clauses, typically forbidding states from adopting certain 
requirements, need to be unambiguous in their restrictions for the court to con-
clude state law is expressly preempted.129 Courts will also look at the comprehen-
siveness of the federal scheme,130 the opinion of the applicable federal agency, and 
the agency’s policy objectives.131 
Section 387p of the TCA titled “Preservation of State and Local Authority” dic-
tates the intent of Congress regarding the preemptive scope of the legislation: 
(1) Preservation 
Except as provided in paragraph (2)(A), nothing in this subchapter, or 
rules promulgated under this subchapter, shall be construed to limit the 
 
 121. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 122. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002). 
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 128. See Halabi, supra note 99 at 313. 
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authority of a Federal agency (including the Armed Forces), a State or 
political subdivision of a State, or the government of an Indian tribe to 
enact, adopt, promulgate, and enforce any law, rule, regulation, or other 
measure with respect to tobacco products that is in addition to, or more 
stringent than, requirements established under this subchapter, includ-
ing a law, rule, regulation, or other measure relating to or prohibiting the 
sale, distribution, possession, exposure to, access to, advertising and 
promotion of, or use of tobacco products by individuals of any age, in-
formation reporting to the State, or measures relating to fire safety 
standards for tobacco products. No provision of this subchapter shall 
limit or otherwise affect any State, tribal, or local taxation of tobacco 
products. 
(2) Preemption of certain State and local requirements 
No State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in 
effect with respect to a tobacco product any requirement which is dif-
ferent from, or in addition to, any requirement under the provisions of 
this subchapter relating to tobacco product standards, premarket re-
view, adulteration, misbranding, labeling, registration, good manufac-
turing standards, or modified risk tobacco products.132 
The findings of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) played an important role 
in the language of the preemption scope of the TCA. The FTC found that “consumers 
have misinterpreted advertisements in which one product is claimed to be less 
harmful than a comparable product, even in the presence of disclosures and advi-
sories intended to provide clarification.”133 The TCA purports to fix this issue by uni-
fying what the tobacco industry can and cannot say on their labels.134 
This language led many scholars to believe that the statute should not be read 
as preempting state tort and consumer protection laws.135 This would allow states 
to implement a broad range of protections to combat the use of tobacco products. 
What was less certain, however, was the scope of constitutional preemption for 
conventional products under the TCA would apply to the same extent for ENDS.136 
The full preemptive scope of the TCA in regards to ENDS was addressed by the Dis-
trict Court’s decision on JUUL Labs’ Motion to Dismiss in the class action suit Colgate 
v. JUUL Labs, Inc.137 
 
 132. Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §387p (2009). 
 133. Tobacco Control Act, Public Law 111-31 [H.R. 1256] Section 2 Findings 7 and 8 para. 41. 
 134. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Halabi, supra note 99 at 326 (discussing how the most loyal interpretation of the TCA is that it was 
drafted “to apply to a narrow class of state regulatory mechanisms like parallel and confliction review of an 
MRTP label.”). 
 136. See generally id. (discussing the possible preemptive scope of modified risk tobacco products under 
the TCA). 
 137. See infra Part III. 
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III. THE PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF THE TCA 
A. Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc. 
This class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California on April 26, 2018.138 The lead plaintiffs, Bradley Colgate of La 
Jolla, California and Kaytlin McKnight of Arroyo Grande, California, claim they each 
used several JUUL pods a week after becoming addicted to the nicotine salts.139 
Colgate alleges he purchased the JUUL device to help him quit conventional ciga-
rettes, but was unable to because “[t]he intense dosage of nicotine salts delivered 
by the JUUL products resulted in an increased nicotine addiction, and an increased 
consumption of nicotine by Colgate.”140 
In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged JUUL Labs’ marketing targeted adoles-
cents, which had the foreseeable effect of causing adolescents to use their prod-
uct.141 The complaint alleges JUUL Labs’ advertisements, which featured young, at-
tractive models in Times Square billboards, magazines spreads, and social media 
promotions, were “specifically aimed at convincing young people who were not 
previously cigarette smokers to purchase JUUL, to make the use of JUUL appear fun 
and without long-term negative consequences, to position the JUUL e-cigarette as 
the e-cigarette of choice for young adults, and to attract even younger persons who 
were not adults to the “hipness” of using the JUUL product.”142 The Complaint al-
leges JUUL Labs’ non-tobacco store retail locations are specifically situated near 
high schools to increase the chances adolescents see the product.143 Furthermore, 
the Complaint alleges that the selection of fruity flavors offered by JUUL has the 
foreseeable consequence of appealing to adolescents.144 Plaintiffs point to several 
studies that indicate adolescents are more likely to use a flavored e-cigarette be-
cause it hides the unpleasant characteristic of cigarette smoke.145 
The Complaint cites several studies that indicate JUUL’s e-cigarette delivers a 
higher, faster dose of nicotine than a traditional cigarette, even though the com-
pany advertised the dose was equivalent.146 One study indicated that the nicotine 
salts used by JUUL caused more than “20 percent more nicotine to enter the blood 
than a Pall Mall cigarette.”147 The Complaint also states that JUUL Labs’ advertise-
ment claiming its product is a safer alternative to cigarettes is misleading because 
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the product still poses adverse health risks, including increased vulnerability to nic-
otine addiction.148 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleged 11 causes of action against JUUL; “(1) False Adver-
tising; (2) Violation of Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750, 
et seq., and similar laws of other states; (3) Fraud; (4) Unfair, Unlawful and Decep-
tive Trade Practices, Business and Professions Code § 17200 and similar laws of 
other states; (5) Unjust Enrichment, (6) Strict Liability — Failure to Warn; (7) Strict 
Product Liability — Design Defect; (8) Strict Liability — Manufacturing Defect; (9) 
Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability; (10) Breach of Express Warranty; 
and (11) Negligent Misrepresentation.”149 
B. The Motion to Dismiss Ruling 
JUUL Labs argued that the plaintiffs’ claims alleging JUUL should be held liable for 
failing to warn consumers that nicotine salts were more addictive should be dis-
missed because JUUL met the labeling standards outlined in 21 C.F.R. § 1143.3(a)(1) 
and 21 C.F.R. § 1143.3(a)(2).150 JUUL Labs alleged that this is all that was required 
because the TCA’s preemption provision explicitly states that local and state juris-
dictions may not make any labeling requirement that differs from the provisions in 
the TCA.151 
To determine the scope of preclusion under the TCA, the District Court analyzed 
the language of §387p with the labeling requirements promulgated by the FDA in 
21 C.F.R. § 1143.3(a)(1) and 21 C.F.R. § 1143.3(a)(2).152 The District Court concluded 
that congress intended the TCA to expressly preempt labeling requirements on 
ENDS packaging.153 The District Court found that that the FDA “unambiguously put 
forth the required language of the nicotine warning label . . . [and] through its au-
thority under the TCA has prescribed the precise language and placement of warn-
ing labels on covered tobacco products such as ENDS.”154 
Furthermore, the District Court concluded that under the TCA’s preemption pro-
vision, “states and political subdivisions of states may not enact labeling require-
ments or warnings contrary or in addition to those proscribed under 21 C.F.R. § 
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1143.3(a)(1)(2).”155 As a result, the District Court held that plaintiffs’ claims regard-
ing JUUL Labs failure “to warn consumers that JUUL’s nicotine formulation is more 
addictive than other methods of nicotine” is expressly preempted.156 
The District Court also analyzed the exception clause of § 387p(2)(B)157 and con-
cluded the TCA does not preempt a claim for fraudulent or misleading advertise-
ments.158 This means that plaintiffs’ claim alleging each JUUL pod actually contains 
the equivalent nicotine dose of 24 cigarettes instead of 20 as advertised survives 
JUUL’s motion to dismissal because, if true, plaintiffs have legitimate claims for un-
just enrichment, design defect, manufacturing defect, breach of implied warranty 
of merchantability, and negligent misrepresentation.159 
C. The Future of JUUL and the E-Cigarette Industry 
The District Court’s ruling is consistent with Congress’ intent for the TCA to work 
along-side state regulatory schemes to provide effective oversight of the tobacco’s 
industries practices.160 Interpreting the TCA as not preempting a broad range of 
state tort claims is also consistent with Congress’ understanding of the role private 
litigation has played in exposing the deceptions promulgated by the tobacco indus-
try.161  Although the ruling is consistent with Congress’ intent to allow state law 
actions, it also highlighted a weakness of the TCA in its ability to effectively warn 
consumers of the unique dangers of ENDS. 
Although JUUL Labs could still be held liable for misrepresenting how much nic-
otine is in their product, the Colgate decision means states cannot force JUUL Labs 
to alter its warning labels on the JUUL to reflect the correct amount of nicotine. This 
could have significant consequences as most teenage consumers are not aware 
JUUL has nicotine, let alone the possibility that it contains more nicotine than ciga-
rettes.162 While it is possible this lack of knowledge results from JUUL’s advertising 
on social media and other platforms frequented by youths, the lack of sufficient 
warnings on the products could also play a factor. However, unless the labeling 
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requirements are changed, states cannot force JUUL Labs to warn consumers of the 
unique dangers of the JUUL on the product’s label. 
The future for JUUL Labs and ENDS in general is uncertain. Although JUUL Labs 
has altered many of its advertising practices, and support regulations banning its 
own flavored products,163 the company is still looking to continue its explosive 
growth. In December 2018, Altria Group, the owners of Marlboro cigarette manu-
facture, Philip Morris USA, injected $12.8 billion in JUUL Labs in exchange for a 35 
percent interest in the company.164 Former CEO of JUUL Labs, Kevin Burns, com-
mented that while initially skeptical, the partnership with Altria will allow JUUL to 
“accelerate our success switching adult smokers.”165 
CONCLUSION 
The explosive growth of electronic cigarettes in general suggests the e-cigarette 
market will soon overtake a large portion of the tobacco market. Effective regula-
tion of these products is therefore vitally important as their popularity continues to 
grow and the health effects become better understood. Though the passage of the 
TCA has given states and the FDA important tools to protect consumers, the District 
Court’s ruling in Colgate highlights the limitations of this statute.166 
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